



1. Do EU member states compete with each other
over corporate tax rates? 
Those who believe that there is tax competition within
the EU have some powerful circumstantial evidence to
support their case. Figure 5.1 describes what has hap-
pened to rates of corporation tax in the EU over the last
ten years, showing the average for old and new members
separately. There is a clear difference between the two
groups: on average the tax rate of the old members
exceeds that of the new members by nearly 10 percent-
age points. Equally significant is that there is a clear
downward trend for both groups of countries. The old
member states reduced their tax rates, on average, from
around 38 to 30 percent between 1995 and 2006, while
the new member states reduced their average from
around 30 to just over 20 percent. 
These reductions are not simply the result of major
reforms in a few countries. In fact, as shown in Table 5.1,
16 out of the 25 members reduced their tax rates in the
last four years 2003 to 2006 (and no country increased its
rate). Many of these reductions have been substantial,
and they are continuing. 
Of course, on their own, reductions in tax rates are not
conclusive evidence that tax competition is taking place.
There are possible explanations of such reductions that
do not involve tax competition: for example, it may sim-
ply be the case that a new view of the potential harm of
high corporate tax rates is sweeping through Europe,
inducing governments to follow similar policies. 
And if there is tax competition, there is the question of
why rates are falling now. Certainly the EU15 have had
free mobility of capital for many years. If competition
were important, then we might have expected them to
have reached very low – or even zero – tax rates by the
mid 1990s, before the period shown in Figure 5.1. One
clue to the “why now?” question is, however, the role
played by the new members who joined the EU in 2004.
Figure 5.1 shows that the average tax rate in these coun-
tries is substantially below the average for the older
members. Figure 5.2 shows that the differences between
these two groups in 2006 are striking. With three excep-
tions, the distribution of tax rates among the new mem-
ber states is entirely below the distribution amongst the
older members. Nine of the countries with the lowest
eleven rates are new member states (the exceptions are
Ireland and Austria), and only one new member (Malta)
has a tax rate comparable to the older members.
So it is certainly plausible that the EU enlargement in
May 2004 has led to a more aggressive form of tax com-
petition within the EU, which is consistent with the pat-
tern of tax rate reductions since 2003. 
Another clue is the introduction of
the euro. The euro has created a
common capital market among the
euro countries, which came along
with a nearly perfect equalisation
of interest rates, more international
transparency, the elimination of
exchange rate risks and, in general,
more cross-border mobility of cap-
ital. If high tax countries were
afraid of losing out in the competi-
tion for mobile capital, then their
fear may have led to actions after
the advent of the euro. 
There is one puzzling feature of the
recent development of corporation
Figure 5.1taxes in the EU, however. Despite the substantial falls in
tax rates, tax revenues have held up. Figure 5.3 shows
what has happened to the ratio of corporation tax rev-
enues to GDP over the last ten years.1 The ratio is again
averaged separately over the old and new members.
Usually, corporation tax revenues rise in good times,
when profit rates are high, and fall in bad times when
profit rates are low. So we would not expect the ratio to
GDP to be very constant over time.
Nevertheless, the pattern shown in Figure 5.3 is surpris-
ing. Tax revenues in the older members actually rose
over this decade, beginning at 2.7 percent of GDP and
rising to 3.7 percent before falling back to 3.1 percent.
Tax revenues in the new member
states were more stable, beginning
at 2.9 percent before holding a fair-
ly constant position between 2.5
and 2.7 percent of GDP. 
There may be several explanations
for the different patterns observed
in Figures 5.1 and 5.3, with falling
tax rates but stable revenues. One
factor is that countries have tended
to expand the definition of taxable
profit at the same time as reducing
rates – for example, by removing
special allowances intended to
boost investment. This also implies
that the effective tax rates – which
take into account changes to the tax
base and which are therefore more
likely to affect flows of capital –
have not fallen by as much as the
headline rates shown in Figure 5.1. However, these
effective tax rates have also fallen, which suggests that
this cannot be the only explanation for the strong perfor-
mance of corporation tax revenues. Another possible
explanation is the rise in profits that has taken place in
many EU countries. There is also evidence that an
increasing proportion of corporation tax revenues is
coming from the financial sector, which has been highly
profitable over much of this period. 
An important issue here is the location of profit.
Multinational corporations are able – within limits – to
shift both real economic activity and taxable profits
between countries. Indeed, it is to
attract both of these that govern-
ments may compete with each
other, as discussed below. The evi-
dence in Figure 5.4 suggests that
such shifting may be very impor-
tant. This figure examines the tax
base of corporation tax as a per-
centage of GDP in each country
(calculated by grossing up corpo-
ration tax revenues by the tax
rate). It compares this to the statu-
tory tax rate in the same country.
Each point in the diagram repre-
sents an EU country, based on
averages over the ten-year period
1995 to 2004. 
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Table 5.1  
Corporation tax rate reductions in the EU for retained earnings, 2003–06
a)
  Reduction ( percent)  Year of reform 
Austria  34 to 25  2005 
Belgium  39 to 33  2003 
Cyprus  25 to 15 to 10  2003, 2005 
Czech Republic  31 to 28 to 26 to 24  2004, 2005, 2006 
Denmark  30 to 28  2005 
Estonia  26 to 24 to 23  2005, 2006 
France  35.4 to 34.9 to 34.4  2005, 2006 
Germany  32 to 30.5  2004 
Greece  35 to 32 to 29  2005, 2006 
Hungary  18 to 16  2004 
Italy  36 to 34 to 33  2003, 2004 
Latvia  22 to 19 to 15  2003, 2004 
Netherlands  34.5 to 31.5 to 29.6  2005, 2006 
Poland  28 to 27 to 19  2003, 2004 
Portugal  30 to 25  2004 
Slovak Republic  25 to 19  2004 
a) Reductions shown are for national tax rates only. The diagrams also include 
local taxes on profit. 
Figure 5.2
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If a higher tax rate induces real economic activity and
profit to shift out of the country, then we might expect
there to be a negative relationship between these two
variables. This indeed appears to be the case – but the
size of the effect is remarkable. At one extreme,
Germany had the highest tax rate over this period, aver-
aging nearly 50 percent; its taxable income averaged
only just 2 percent of GDP. At the other extreme, Ireland
had a 10 percent tax rate (strictly only on manufacturing
activities) for most of the period; its taxable income
averaged 32 percent of GDP. The other countries lie
between these two extremes, with a clear, and large, neg-
ative relationship. 
It is clear that the trends in statutory rates are strongly
consistent with an ongoing process of competition. This
is supported by econometric evidence that in choosing
their tax rates governments do take account of the levels
of tax rates in other countries.2,3
The cross section differences in
taxable income reinforce the likeli-
hood of competition. We would
normally think of a reduction in the
tax rate as causing a reduction in
tax revenue, which would repre-
sent a cost to the strategy of reduc-
ing the rate to attract inward
investment and profit. But there
seems to be a reasonable chance of
revenue actually increasing fol-
lowing a tax rate reduction in a
country: given such evidence, it is
perhaps surprising that the process
of tax competition has not already
developed further. 
2. What are governments competing for? 
It is worth considering in a little more detail the question:
“What are governments competing for?” As suggested
above, there are two (or more) possible answers: (a) real
economic activity: flows of firms and capital, attracted
by low effective tax rates; and (b) taxable income,
attracted by low statutory (or headline) tax rates. 
There is plenty of empirical evidence that flows of cap-
ital and flows of taxable profit are both affected by dif-
ferences in taxes across countries. For example, De
Mooij and Ederveen (2005) have conducted a meta-
analysis of a large number of empirical studies of the
effects of tax on flows of foreign direct investment
between countries. Based on a sample of 427 esti-
mates, they find that, at the median, flows of foreign
direct investment rise by 2.7 per-
cent in response to a one percent-
age point fall in the effective cor-
poration tax rate. Of course, there
is a great deal of variation across
Figure 5.3
Figure 5.4
2 See Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano
(2005).
3 One argument suggests that tax rates will
not fall to zero. Because some of the larger
capital exporting countries (the US and the
UK) tax worldwide income with a credit for
foreign taxes, capital importing countries
have some incentive not to reduce their rates
below the rates of the capital exporters.
However, a counter example appears to be
Ireland, which has benefited from a low tax
rate – with large inflows of capital and prof-
it from US corporations. That suggests that
deferral of repatriation, or other profit shift-
ing, enables US companies to benefit from
the low Irish rate, and implies this credit
argument for maintaining higher tax rates is
weak.studies, but this conclusion suggests that taxes can play
a significant role in affecting capital flows. Broadly, a
new member state with a tax rate 10 percentage points
lower than an older member, might expect to have
inward capital flows 27 percent higher as a result of the
lower tax rate. The effects on the aggregate capital
stock in the country are less clear. If there are no off-
setting effects on domestic investment, then the capital
stock would rise, though in the short run by much less
than the change in investment. But it is also possible
that new inward investment could either crowd out
some domestic investment, or stimulate higher domes-
tic investment. 
But some evidence suggests that the effect is even larger
for capital flows into the new member states. Bellak and
Leibrecht (2005) found a response for flows to new
member states to a one percentage point increase in the
corporation tax of between – 3.3 percent and  – 4.6 per-
cent. More aggressive tax competition arising from the
accession of the new member states is certainly consis-
tent with the allocation of capital between new and old
member states being particularly sensitive to corporation
tax rates. 
There is also considerable evidence that multinational
companies are able to shift profits between countries in
order to take account of more generous tax provisions.4
They can do this in a number of ways. For example, a
simple approach is for a multinational to place its equity
capital in a subsidiary located in a low-tax country while
allocating its debt to a subsidiary in a high tax rate coun-
try. The borrowing subsidiary can offset the interest pay-
ments against tax at a high tax rate, while the equity-
using subsidiary pays tax on the return to equity at a low
tax rate, creating a gain to the multinational and to the
low tax rate country at the expense of the high tax rate
country. 
Another example concerns the pricing of intra-company
trade. If one subsidiary of the multinational company
trades with another, then the company typically has
some discretion over the price at which the good is
transferred. Both this transfer price and the use of debt
are subject to numerous complex provisions aimed at
minimising the extent to which companies can shift tax-
able income to lower-taxed countries. However, it is
typically difficult for tax authorities to identify and pre-
vent tax planning. Certainly the evidence in Figure 5.4
is consistent with significant movement of taxable
income between countries. 
3. Is competition from new member states unfair? 
If, as seems plausible from the evidence presented
above, the accession of the new member states has led to
a period of more aggressive tax competition, then how
should old member states respond? 
One possible response is to complain about “unfair” tax
competition. For example, at the time of the accession,
Gerhard Schröder, the then German Chancellor, claimed
that it was unacceptable “that Germany, as the EU’s
biggest net payer, finances unfair tax competition against
itself”. 
Is there a case that tax competition is unfair? It is hard to
see what that case might be. In the absence of agreed
coordination of corporation tax rates in Brussels, then
each member state has sovereignty in setting its own tax
rate. And this sovereignty has been jealously guarded by
members to such an extent that there has been almost no
progress towards coordination, despite many recommen-
dations to do so dating back over many decades. 
It is true that a low tax rate in one country may result in
capital or profit shifting to that country from another. If
a government acts in its own national interest, the costs
incurred by other countries will not be taken into
account. Since they do not take into account the full costs
of their actions, all countries may end up with lower tax
on corporate profit than they would otherwise choose.
The result of such competition is that all countries may
therefore end up worse off.
But there is nothing specific about this account which
applies particularly to new member states. In some ways,
they are already an attractive location for new invest-
ment, for example with lower wage rates than in the
older member states. Offset against that, however, is a
weaker infrastructure, an issue to which we will return
below. But if the new member states seek to improve the
chances of attracting new firms and investment, they are
not behaving differently from other members – indeed
they could be seen as simply following the example of
Ireland, although in a less extreme form. 
What Chancellor Schröder seemed to be objecting to is
that the new member states also receive regional aid
from the EU – which is, in effect, paid for by the older
members, Germany as the EU’s largest net payer in par-
ticular. To the extent that regional aid could be seen as
compensating for lost revenue from aggressive corpora-
tion tax setting, then the older members could be thought
to be paying for tax cuts in the new member states. 
EEAG Report 124
Chapter 5
4 For a survey, see Devereux (2006).EEAG Report 125
Chapter 5
But there are at least two responses to this claim. First,
linking corporation tax and regional aid reflects some
confusion in the older member states. On the one hand,
they support the principle of regional aid to the new
member states, which helps to provide better infra-
structure, which will attract more capital, partly from
the west, and which ultimately will bring about a
process of wage convergence. But if the old member
states support that aim, then it is not clear why they
should object to low corporation tax rates in new mem-
ber states, which is likely to have a similar economic
impact. Just because both are happening simultaneous-
ly does not give cause for believing the tax competition
is unfair.
Second, it is by no means clear that subsidies induce the
recipient countries to lower their tax rates, as lower tax
rates may well result in higher rather than lower tax rev-
enue. Although Figure 5.3 shows that the east European
countries are raising a smaller proportion of GDP from
corporation tax, the evidence of Figure 5.4 hints that
reducing the tax rate may generate such an increase in
taxable income that tax revenues may actually rise.
Thus, if Schröder wants the recipient countries to charge
internationally mobile capital with higher tax rates he
might well advocate increasing rather than cutting the
subsidies. 
That being said, Schröder does have a point insofar as
the process of tax competition in general tends to erode
the corporate tax revenue. While a single country could
possibly increase its tax revenue by cutting its tax
rates, all countries together cannot achieve such a
result, as the movements of tax bases and equity capi-
tal will only result from international differences in tax
rates. If all countries cut their tax rates simultaneously,
the corporate tax revenue will indeed decline, unless
there is a substantial increase in overall investment.
Given that the corporate tax is needed as one of the fis-
cal revenue raisers, this in itself is an argument for tax
coordination among countries, a topic to which we will
return below.
4. What are the costs of tax competition? 
There is a broad issue here which goes beyond simply
considering whether new member states are responsible
for increased downward pressure on corporation tax
rates. That is the consequence of lower corporation tax
rates in terms of economic welfare. As with all taxes,
there are two main aspects of their consequences for wel-
fare: economic efficiency and equity.
In terms of efficiency, there has been a concern that
charging lower taxes on capital will result in higher taxes
on labour, and that higher taxes on labour can exacerbate
distortions to labour markets, resulting in greater unem-
ployment. Indeed, the European Commission (1997) has
itself made this type of argument.
Basic economic theory does not support this argument –
indeed it supports the reverse. The argument is set out in
Box 5.1. It depends on capital being mobile, while labour
is not mobile or, at least, not as mobile. Indeed if capital
is perfectly mobile, it is optimal for a small open country
to tax capital very lightly. To be precise, it is optimal not
to impose a tax rate above the marginal congestion cost
of infrastructure. We will return to this topic below and
assume for a moment for simplicity that the marginal
cost of infrastructure is zero. In this case, a tax on capi-
tal would have a more severe impact on economic activ-
ity, and hence on the demand for labour, than a tax on
labour. 
Whether the reduction in the demand for labour affects
unemployment depends on the extent to which the wage
rate is flexible. With strong unions trying to hold up the
wage, wage reductions cannot come about without more
unemployment. With more flexibility unemployment
would be lower.
So, from basic economic theory, a good case could be
made that a small, open country acting on its own with-
out coordination with other countries should in any case
not tax the income on capital located in that country, and
by extension should not tax corporate profit located
there. 
Two caveats to this reasoning should be noted. One con-
cerns the “effective tax rate”. The effective tax rate mea-
sures the extent to which the tax as a whole raises the
pre-tax required rate of return on an investment – as
such, it depends not just on the headline tax rate but also
on the definition of taxable income. In practice, how
taxable income is defined varies considerably across
countries; one important factor, for example, is how
quickly capital expenditure can be depreciated for tax
purposes.
It is worth noting here that in principle it is possible to
design a corporation tax which does not affect this pre-
tax required rate of return. An example of such a tax is a
“cash flow” tax, which we discuss further in Section 7
and Box 5.2 below. Essentially, such a tax would define
income for tax purposes to be all receipts less all expen-
ditures. Thus all capital expenditure could be set againsttax in the year in which it was incurred. However, there
would be no relief for the cost of finance. In effect, the
government would become a shareholder in each invest-
ment; it would contribute part of the cost (through fore-
gone tax revenue) and take the same share of the income
generated. The net effect is that the rate of return
required by investors is unaffected; their expenditure and
income is reduced in the same proportion. Since the rate
of return on the investment is not changed, the “effec-
tive” tax rate – or more strictly, the marginal effective tax
rate – is zero. Such a tax has long been favoured by many
economists, precisely because the marginal effective tax
rate is zero.5
Asecond caveat is whether capital really is mobile. Here
we have to be careful about the definition of capital. A
building that houses a car factory is clearly immobile – it
would be extremely costly to move it, brick by brick, to
another location, and it is inconceivable that anyone
would want to. So there is a sense in which capital which
has already been invested, and
which cannot easily be moved,
falls outside the analysis in
Box 5.1. Economists have noted
the possibility in these cases of
introducing penal taxes on the
owners of capital due to a “time
consistency” problem: before the
investment is undertaken the gov-
ernment has an incentive to
promise low tax rates on the
return to the investment, but after
it has been undertaken – when the
capital has become immobile – it
has an incentive to charge very
high rates. 
But there are two reasons why
governments would not follow
this approach in practice. First,
although the factory itself might
not move, the activity in the facto-
ry might. The company could set
up another factory elsewhere and
move production. This, too,
would be costly, but the company
is not constrained by the physical
immobility of the asset itself.
Second, investment and taxation
is not a one-off event. Imagine the
reaction of future investors if a
government did renege on its promises by imposing a
high tax rate on already-installed capital. Such future
investors would be unlikely to believe any promises
made to them by the government, and they would take
their capital elsewhere. So it is hardly a sensible strategy
for a government. 
Despite the theory, of course in practice governments do
tax the income generated by activities of corporations
located within their country, possibly for some good and
some bad reasons. From the perspective of a small open
country, one bad reason is a concern about an inequitable
distribution of tax. Abandoning a tax on capital income
looks like favouring one group of the population (proba-
bly a wealthier group, since it has funds to invest) over
the rest. Why should earned income be taxed when cap-
ital income is untaxed? However, in the context of a
small country acting on its own, the answer lies in the
analysis in Box 5.1: because the tax on capital does not
make the owners of capital worse off, but is passed on to
residents. It is more efficient, and no more inequitable, to




The effects of the taxation of capital in an open economy 
Consider a country which allows free movement of capital. Suppose that the return on 
capital, net of all taxes, required by investors in the rest of the world is 10 percent, 
and that this country is too small to have any effect on that required rate of return. 
These conditions apply to most EU members: call this country Belgium. That means 
that Belgian investors can expect to earn 10 percent on any outward investment from 
the country. It also means that any other investors in the world will expect to earn 
10 percent in Belgium after taxes. If they earn less than 10 percent they will take their 
capital elsewhere. If the return in Belgium exceeds 10 percent, new capital will flow 
in, driving down the rate of return until it reaches 10 percent.  
What would be the effect of a tax on the return to capital located in Belgium? All 
investors would continue to require a return of 10 percent after tax, since they can still 
earn that elsewhere. This implies that the pre-tax rate of return in Belgium must rise. 
For example if the effective tax rate is 33 percent, then the pre-tax rate of return must 
rise to 15 percent, leaving the post-tax rate of return at 10 percent. This would be 
achieved by some investors shifting their capital out of Belgium. As the total capital 
stock falls, then the marginal return on the remaining capital would rise. A tax in 
Belgium would therefore reduce investment in Belgium. This is a cost in terms of 
economic inefficiency.  
Now consider the case in which the tax revenue is raised by a tax on labour income. 
Given the mobility of capital and the relative immobility of labour, the labour force 
will not be able to pass on the tax burden to the owners of capital, who continue to 
earn 10 percent after tax. Instead, the labour force must bear the “effective incidence” 
of the tax, in terms of a lower net wage. The capital stock would be unaffected.  
That seems to imply that a tax on labour income may be more efficient but less fair. 
But that is not true. Who bears the “effective” incidence of the corporation tax? Just 
as with a tax on labour income, it cannot be the owners of capital. Instead the tax 
must be passed on, in lower gross wage payments and higher output prices, to be 
borne by Belgian residents. In either case, then, the tax burden falls on domestic 
residents. But in the case of corporation tax, there is also inefficiency in the form of 
an economic distortion to the level of investment. This is the basic argument for a 
small, open country such as Belgium not to have a tax on capital located there.
a)
a) There is a separate argument that even a closed economy should not tax the returns to capital. 
For example, in a closed economy model Lucas (1990) estimates that eliminating capital income 
taxation in the US would increase the capital stock by 35 percent, and long run consumption by  
7 percent. But in this chapter we focus on the issues raised by the mobility of capital in open 
economies.  
5 See, for example, Meade Committee (1978)EEAG Report 127
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5. The role of infrastructure
As with any economic theory, there are real world
complexities which are not taken into account in
Box 5.1, apart from those mentioned above. One is
worth considering in more detail, especially in the
context of the EU. That is the role of infrastructure –
in particular, infrastructure which is publicly provided
and which enhances productivity of capital. Such
infrastructure might include obvious assets such as
roads and other transport provision, but also less con-
crete goods such as the rule of law and the ability to
enforce property rights. It is unlikely that such infra-
structure could be categorised solely as supporting
production: it is also likely to provide consumption
benefits to residents.
To the extent that this infrastructure is free to the user,
and supports production, then it causes a complication to
the basic analytical framework set out in Box 5.1.
Suppose, like a road, that the infrastructure is a public
good, but that there are congestion costs – each user adds
a small amount to the congestion costs which are
imposed on himself and on other users. Each user will
use the public good up to the point at which the margin-
al benefit of doing so equals the private congestion cost.
But they will ignore the additional costs imposed at the
margin on other users. In theory it is optimal for the gov-
ernment to impose a tax on users equal to the marginal
congestion externality, which is the difference between
the marginal social cost and marginal private cost. If the
government does so, then effectively each user will take
into account the whole marginal social cost and not just
his own private cost. 
Now suppose that the aggregate social congestion cost
depends on the amount of capital used. One form in
which such a tax could be imposed would therefore be
through a positive tax on the return to capital. But while
such a tax could in principle generate the optimal use of
the public good, and the optimal amount of capital in
the economy, it would not necessarily raise enough rev-
enue to finance the provision of the public good.6 If
there are constant returns to scale in the provision of
public goods in the sense that doubling the amount of
capital, given the user quality of the public good,
requires doubling the production cost of public infra-
structure, then an efficient congestion tax on capital
will just generate enough revenue to finance the cost of
the infrastructure. This case is relevant with those kinds
of infrastructure that are provided on local levels
assuming that the size of local communities is optimal-
ly chosen. Examples are the local police or local roads.
However, nation-wide public goods, such as interstate
roads, the law system or national defence, are likely to
exhibit increasing returns to scale in the sense that the
infrastructure cost does not have to double if the
amount of capital doubles. With such public goods an
optimally designed congestion charge will not be able
to fully cover the cost of the public infrastructure. The
remaining cost would therefore have to be financed by
a tax on residents. It would nevertheless be in the inter-
ests of residents to finance the provision of the public
good, since it enhances the productivity of capital and
hence attracts more capital. 
The spirit of this result is similar to the one explained in
Section 4, but in a sense it goes even further. Without
marginal infrastructure costs, the fiscal revenue that a
country can reasonably collect from internationally
mobile capital is zero. With such costs the fiscal revenue
the country should collect might even be negative,
because the revenue from the corporate tax falls short of
the cost of providing the infrastructure that this capital
uses. However, from a practical perspective, there is
some tax revenue after all, and it does not have to be
feared that tax competition will wipe out the corporation
tax completely. The marginal cost of hosting the mobile
capital will always be the lower bound below which
competitive forces will not be able to drive the corporate
tax revenue. 
6. Does competition require a coordinated response?
The central problem identified in this chapter – of com-
petition driving down the rate of tax on corporate income
– is not necessarily a problem of economic efficiency.
Indeed, Box 5.1 indicates that there is a case for allow-
ing competition to drive the EU to an efficient outcome
in which income from capital is not taxed at all in the
country in which the capital is located. 
Nevertheless, governments clearly would prefer to con-
tinue to raise revenue by taxing corporate profits arising
within their jurisdiction. One reason is clear from Figu-
re 5.3: governments raise close to 3 percent of GDP in
corporation tax. Whatever the economic arguments, they
are reluctant to give up such an income stream. A more
general difficulty in not taxing the return to capital
income is consideration of equity. Whether or not it is
justified, many people find it unjust if capital is being
taxed at a lower rate than income arising from labour
income.  6 For an explanation of this point, see Sinn (2003).Such a view partly stems from the notion of a compre-
hensive income tax – where labour and capital incomes
are taxed at the same rate. But some countries have
explicitly accepted the principle that capital and labour
income should be taxed at different rates. The “dual
income tax” system used in Scandinavian countries com-
bines a progressive tax on earned income with a low,
flat-rate tax on capital income. 
Are there other reforms which would improve the fair-
ness of the tax system? We first consider in this section
whether coordination across EU countries could solve,
or at least mitigate, these problems. In the next section,
we consider more radical options open to individual
governments. 
In principle, if all governments agreed to coordinate by
charging the same effective rate of tax, then the analysis
of Box 5.1 would become redundant. The owners of
capital would face the same tax wherever they located
their capital, and even if capital were perfectly mobile,
they would not be able to avoid paying the tax. In this
situation, owners of capital would share at least part of
the tax burden through a lower post-tax rate of return.
This may then provide the basis for a more equitable tax
system. 
However, it is not clear that anything short of a single,
global tax could achieve this end. As long as some coun-
tries – inside or outside of the EU – maintain a different
tax system, then there may be opportunities for owners
of capital to shift activities and profit to reduce their
overall tax liabilities. Even a single tax within the EU
would not meet this requirement. And in practice, cer-
tainly for the foreseeable future, it seems highly unlikely
that there could be a single tax within the EU.
Moreover, harmonising capital income tax rates would
have very problematic effects for the provision of public
infrastructure, which is also an important element in the
location decisions of companies. Clearly countries
would shift their attention to the possibility of luring in
capital with infrastructure gifts if it is impossible to
attract it with lower tax rates. They would overprovide
infrastructure for mobile capital if the capital income tax
rate is harmonised above the “equilibrium” rate that is
the outcome of unbridled tax competition.7As it is diffi-
cult to harmonise infrastructure expenses, one possible
solution to this which has been proposed is a self-financ-
ing constraint. This would consist of governments
agreeing to pay for the public good out of taxes on cap-
ital income. In principle, this could lead to an optimal
provision of the public good, paid for by the owners of
capital.
However, such a tax would require the self-financing
constraint to differentiate between public goods used in
production and consumption. In practice it would be
very hard to specify how the cost of public goods
should be shared among consumers and firms. Basic
infrastructure, such as roads and other essential inputs,
enforcement of property rights and the rule of law, edu-
cation, defence, and health provision are also all used in
consumption.
The form of coordination currently being considered
within the EU is a “common consolidated corporate tax
base”, known as the CCCTB. The idea is that companies
could select to have their EU-wide profits determined
only once; they would not need to allocate their taxable
profit between EU member states. Instead taxable profit
would be allocated between countries on the basis of a
simple formula, unrelated to profit. This has some advan-
tages – there would be no gain to shifting profits between
EU countries since it would not affect the tax liability –
but it is not designed to combat the problems of tax com-
petition considered here. Indeed, under the Commis-
sion’s proposal, countries would keep the right to set
their own tax rates, and so there would continue to be
competition in the setting of statutory rates. 
An alternative approach would be to propose that indi-
vidual countries agree to harmonise their taxes. But to be
effective, this would require harmonisation of effective
tax rates, not just the headline rate. This implies setting a
single definition of the tax base for all countries, as well
as a single tax rate, which would be extremely complex.
And even if this were achieved, there remains the prob-
lem of competition with countries outside the EU,
including from tax havens with very low rates.
So it is unlikely that coordination of corporation taxes
within the EU is likely to be able to solve the problems
described above, which arise from tax competition. 
7. Other potential solutions
To consider alternative solutions, it is useful to begin by
noting that we have considered only one particular form
of a capital income tax. That is, we have considered only
a tax on the income arising from capital located in a par-
ticular country – known as a “source-based” tax, since
the tax is levied in the location of the source of the
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income. (In practice it may be very difficult to identify
the source of income, which is one reason companies are
able to shift profit between countries. But we will leave
that issue aside here.) One superficially attractive aspect
of such a tax is that it may appear to be levied on non-
residents (and non-voters), since the owners of the capi-
tal located in a country may not actually reside in that
country. However, this is likely to be a mirage: as argued
in Box 5.1, it is instead likely that a tax levied on capital
in a small open country will effectively be borne by
domestic residents.
7.1 Residence-based taxation
The most commonly considered alternative to a source-
based tax is a tax on the income on capital owned by res-
idents, wherever that capital is located: this would be a
“residence-based” tax. For example, a German capital
owner would be taxed under the German tax system on
earnings from all his capital, even if that capital were
located outside Germany. A residence-based tax would
have very different properties from a source-based tax,
particularly with respect to equity. The reason why a
source-based tax on capital income is not usually inci-
dent on the owner of capital is because the owner is able
to move the capital away from a highly taxed jurisdic-
tion. But the owner of capital cannot avoid a residence-
based tax except by changing residence. Given that indi-
viduals are relatively immobile, it is much more likely
that the owners of capital would bear the incidence of a
residence-based tax. 
If such a residence-based tax could be made practical,
then it would have two clear advantages over a source-
based tax. First, it could be more efficient, in that the
location of capital would not affect the tax liability, and
hence taxes would not distort the location choice.
Second, it may well be more equitable, as capital owners
could not avoid the tax by shifting capital between coun-
tries. However, there are overwhelming practical diffi-
culties in implementing such a tax, since it requires the
tax authorities to keep track of capital income earned
abroad, and possibly not remitted back to the owner. It is
to combat such difficulties that the EU has agreed the
Savings Directive, which requires member states to
exchange information about interest income earned in
another member state. But while the Savings Directive
may help in tracking the interest income of EU individ-
ual residents, it does not apply to profit earned by corpo-
rations. 
The “residence” of corporations is in any case ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, it could refer to the residence of
the shareholders of the corporation. But it is simply not
practical to tax a resident’s share of a non-resident cor-
poration’s profit, especially if that profit is not remitted
back to the owner in the form of a dividend – indeed the
corporation tax exists partly because it is not even prac-
tical to do so when both shareholder and corporation
are resident in the same country. In principle it might be
possible to tax this income through a capital gains tax
levied in the shareholder’s country of residence. But
this also raises several problems. To be a substitute for
taxing profit as it is generated, it would have to be
levied on an annual basis, whether or not the shares
were sold. It would therefore require an annual valua-
tion of all companies in which the individual holds
shares (and indeed, if introduced comprehensively, an
annual valuation of all assets). It may also cause liquid-
ity problems: the taxpayer may have to sell shares to
raise the cash to pay tax. 
On the other hand, “residence” may refer to the place of
incorporation of a company or where the head office is
located. It may be possible to tax corporate profit accord-
ing to the residence of the corporation itself; indeed
many countries attempt to do so. But there are at least
three problems with doing so. 
First, unless all countries operated a residence basis, then
there may be double taxation since the country where the
capital is located may impose a source-based tax.
(Countries which currently have a form of residence-
based tax typically avoid this double taxation by giving
credit for any source-based taxation paid.) Second, cor-
porations may evade taxes by hiding their profit in
another country. The OECD’s recent attempts to encour-
age tax havens to agree to an exchange of information
with other countries is a step towards dealing with this
problem. Third, and most important, the residence of
corporations is itself mobile, and somewhat tenuous. A
high tax in one country may induce corporations to
incorporate in another country. Since they may undertake
little business anyway in their country of incorporation,
the cost of moving may be small. But if residence is
mobile, then moving to a pure residence-based tax on
corporations would simply introduce competition in
another guise. 
7.2 Destination-based taxation
But if source-based taxes are being competed away,
and residence-based taxes are not a serious option, then
are there any other alternatives? There is one: to con-
sider a different location for taxing profit – that of the
final consumer of the good or service. This would be a“destination-based” tax. One
could argue that it is at least as
reasonable to consider the loca-
tion in which profit is made to be
where the good or service is sold
to a final consumer as where it is
produced. 
If it were possible to construct a
destination-based tax, then it
would share an advantage with a
residence-based tax, in that the tax
would not depend on where the
good or service was produced.
Since individual consumers are
relatively immobile – at least
compared to capital – the location
of economic activities would be
less likely to be affected by the
tax. And as a result, the tax should
be less susceptible to a process of
competition.
Of course, attempting to levy a tax on the profit of a cor-
poration according to where it sells its product to the
final consumer raises the issue of the allocation of costs.
For example, suppose a car plant in Germany sells to
consumers all over the EU. How should the costs
incurred in Germany be allocated to each destination
country to set against income generated there? 
To explore this, it is useful first to return to the cash flow
tax, outlined in Section 4. To recall, one form of such a
tax, the so-called tax on the real cash flow, would give
full tax relief for all real expenditure in the year in which
it was incurred, but not relief for financing costs.8 Hence,
for example, there would be no use of depreciation
schedules to allocate capital spending against income
derived in subsequent years; instead all such expenditure
would be written off immediately. But interest payments
would not be deductible.
Another variant of a cash flow tax would be one where
the financial cash flow is taxed in addition to the real
cash flow, which basically means that retained corporate
earnings are tax free while dividends, net of the revenue
from new share issues, are taxed. The Meade Com-
mittee, which first proposed it in 1978, called it the
S-base tax. 
As described in Box 5.2, cash flow taxes effectively turn
the government into a shareholder: the government con-
tributes a share of all investment expenses and collects
the same share of all revenues. Such a tax is equivalent
to a tax on economic rent and the historically given stock
of capital. The economic rent is any profit above the
minimum required for the investment. Because of this
and as the historic stock of capital is given, the tax is
largely non-distorting: it does not affect decisions as to
how much to invest, nor how to finance investment. 
In an international context, though, a source-based cash
flow tax would not be efficient, for two reasons. First,
there is now considerable evidence that discrete location
choices of multinational companies depend on a com-
parison between post-tax levels of profit from alternative
locations. Suppose a company faced the same pre-tax
level of profit in two potential locations. And suppose
each country levied a cash flow tax, but at different rates.
In this case, the post-tax level of profit would be lower in
the country which had the higher tax rate; and the loca-
tion choice would depend on these taxes, even though
both were on a cash flow basis. Second, corporations
would still be able to shift profits between countries in
response to differences in statutory rates, just as with the
current corporate tax systems. To raise the same revenue
from a cash flow tax as existing taxes would require a
higher statutory rate; this would worsen the profit-shift-
ing problem. 
But now let us bring together these two strands: a desti-
nation-based tax and a cash flow tax. Applying the desti-
nation-base principle to a cash flow tax in fact generates
something similar to a very familiar tax: value added tax.




A cash flow tax 
Consider a risk-free investment which costs 100 euros in period 1 and which 
generates a return of 110 euros in period 2 – a pre-tax rate of return of 10 percent. 
Now suppose that a cash flow tax is levied at the rate of 40 percent. The cost of the 
investment would fall to 60 euros, and the value of the return would fall to 66 euros. 
The rate of return after tax is still 10 percent – a return of 6 euros on an investment of 
60 euros. The government has also made a 10 percent return: in effect, it invested 
40 euros and received 44. 
Now suppose that the risk-free interest rate is 5 percent; an alternative to the investor 
would be to save 100 euros in a bank account, generating a return in period 2 of 
105 euros. Before tax, the investment is worth 110 euros. This excess of 5 euros over 
the return from the bank account is a measure of the economic rent of the investment: 
the return over and above that required to persuade the investor to go ahead with the 
investment.  
With the cash flow tax, the investor only has to invest 60 euros, on which he earns a 
return of 66 euros. By contrast, putting 60 euros in a bank account would yield 
63 euros. So the post-tax economic rent to the investor is 3 euros. The government 
has also effectively earned an economic rent of 2 euros, since if it had put 40 euros in 
the bank, it would have earned only 2 euros instead of 4. Overall, 40 percent of the 
economic rent of 5 euros has been taken by the government. 
8 This is the R-base of the Meade Committee (1978).EEAG Report 131
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income. And VAT can therefore be thought of as a tax on
economic rent, plus a tax at the same rate on labour
income. (Of course, it is not calculated in that way, but it
has the same effect.) VAT is also levied on a destination
basis. This is achieved by applying a zero rate of tax to
exports, while taxing the full value of imports. The net
amount of tax collected in the country of production (the
source country) is therefore zero. (This is achieved by
taxing intermediate stages of production, but rebating all
the tax collected if the output of a later stage of produc-
tion is exported.) In effect, then, the entire VAT payment
is made to the country where the final good or service is
sold (the destination country). 
Now consider a VAT which allows labour income to be
deducted from the tax base. This would be equivalent to
a destination-based cash flow corporation tax. If collect-
ed in the same way as VAT, then overall it would be a tax
on economic rent. Labour costs would be set against tax
in the country in which they were incurred. The destina-
tion country would therefore charge tax on the value of
the final output less any labour costs incurred in that
country. The source country would zero-rate the export,
but still give relief for labour costs incurred in the source
country. 
The fact that labour costs of goods which were export-
ed would have to be rebated by the government in
which production took place would greatly increase
the payment of such rebates.9 And this is certainly a
practical downside if such a new tax were introduced
on its own. 
However, there is a straightforward way to actually
implement such a tax which would not involve such
direct rebates. Adestination-based cash flow corporation
tax could be effectively implemented by increasing the
rate of VAT and making an offsetting reduction in the tax
rate on labour income. Making such changes would
enable governments to reduce the rate of conventional
corporation tax. If this rate were reduced to zero, then
several benefits could be achieved.
The new tax system would not affect the level of invest-
ment nor the type of finance used. It would also not be
susceptible to common methods of profit shifting.
Interest would not be deductible, and so there is no rea-
son to locate debt in a high tax country; and the only
prices which affect the tax liability are those paid by the
final consumer, so intra-company transfer prices are also
irrelevant. For all of these reasons, the tax should not be
subject to competition between countries.
This analysis has glossed over some problems of imple-
menting VAT. Cross-border shopping and carousel fraud
are issues which certainly concern governments. Relying
more heavily on VAT would increase their importance.
But the problem of cross-border shopping depends on
the mobility of consumers. The European Court of
Justice recently upheld that an individual who purchases
a good at a lower tax rate in another member state can
only benefit from that lower tax rate if he or she actual-
ly collects the good in person.10 It is not possible to pay
the lower tax rate abroad by ordering it and having it
delivered. So while cross-border shopping may be a
problem, the mobility of consumers is unlikely to be as
great as the mobility of capital. Hence competition aris-
ing from this is unlikely ever to be as significant as com-
petition for mobile capital and profit which we see under
existing corporation taxes. 
Finally, it is possible to consider ways in which labour
costs could be passed on to the destination country. For
example, exports from one member state to another
could generate a tax credit, representing the labour costs
associated with the export, which could be offset against
tax in the destination country. This might generate a
more reasonable distribution of tax deductions for labour
costs across the EU. However, it would lose some of the
simplicity of the VAT system, and could reintroduce tax
planning opportunities as companies sought to allocate
costs to high tax rate countries.
8. Conclusions
The argument set out here has been that competition for
capital among small open countries could ultimately lead
to the reduction of taxes on income levied by the coun-
try in which the capital is located to a level commensu-
rate with matching marginal social congestion costs for
the use of public infrastructure goods. Economic theory
suggests that such an outcome would be efficient, in the
sense that capital would be efficiently allocated between
countries. 
The most important tax on capital income is the corpora-
tion tax. There is certainly evidence that corporation tax
9 But the net impact on any country would depend on its balance of trade
and labour costs. Suppose trade was balanced. In addition, suppose that
the labour costs incurred in that country (that is, used to produce goods
and services which were consumed domestically or exported) were
equal to the cost of labour used to produce goods which were consumed
in that country. Then in effect the government would be taxing exactly
the economic rent generated on goods and services sold in that country.
But if domestic labour costs were higher, its tax revenue would be lower,
and vice versa. 10 In the case of Staatssecretaris van Financien v BF Joustra.rates have been falling in the EU, which is consistent
with increasingly aggressive competition for capital
between member states, and between EU countries and
non-EU countries. Corporation taxes in the EU are still
some way from zero. However, given the importance of
infrastructure costs this is not inconsistent with competi-
tion, and the realisation that the size of the tax base is
very sensitive to the tax rate may actually encourage
more competition. 
But competition makes it more difficult to rely on taxes
on capital income to help maintain an equitable distribu-
tion of taxation. Coordination of source-based corpora-
tion taxes within the EU is unlikely to prove to be a solu-
tion to this problem. Partly this is because eliminating
competition would intensify the competition with other
policy parameters affecting firms’location decisions and
could possibly lead to an overprovision of public infra-
structure. Partly because of this, there would remain a
problem of competition between the EU and the rest of
the world.
There are other potential forms of corporation tax. It may
be possible to continue to make use of corporation tax on
a residence basis, taxing the owners of capital where they
reside, rather than where the capital is located. However,
that is also unlikely to generate a long term solution,
again for two reasons: it is difficult for tax authorities to
identify the tax base if it is generated abroad, and in any
case the tax may generate competition for corporate
headquarters. 
A more radical alternative would be a corporation tax on
a destination basis, taxing the income where the final
good is sold to a consumer. This would be rather similar
to a VAT – and indeed it could be implemented by
increasing the VAT rate, but making an offsetting cut to
taxes on labour income. Such a system would have con-
siderable advantages in terms of efficiency and equity. It
would be efficient in that the location and size of invest-
ment, the use of different sources of finance, and the
location of profit, would be largely unaffected by tax. It
would be more equitable in that the tax burden would fall
on consumption from unearned income. In sum, the
EEAG advises politicians not to interfere with the
process of tax competition such that the corporate tax
rate will gradually shrink towards the marginal cost of
using the public infrastructure, to increase the VAT and
to reduce the taxes on labour income.
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